Abstract. In this work, we present the first definitions and constructions for functional encryption supporting randomized functionalities. The setting of randomized functionalities require us to revisit functional encryption definitions by, for the first time, explicitly adding security requirements for dishonest encryptors, to ensure that they cannot improperly tamper with the randomness that will be used for computing outputs. Our constructions are built using indistinguishability obfuscation.
Introduction
Originally, encryption was thought of as a way to encrypt "point to point" communication. However, in the contemporary world with cloud computing and complex networks, it has become clear that we need encryption to offer more functionality. To address this issue, the notion of functional encryption (FE) has been developed [25, 18, 5, 19, 4, 21] . In a functional encryption for a family F, it is possible to derive secret keys K f for any function f ∈ F from a master secret key. Given an encryption of some input x, that user can use its secret key K f to obtain f (x), and should learn nothing else about x beyond f (x). A driving force behind functional encryption research has been to understand what class of functions can be supported by functional encryption. This remarkable line of research has progressed to now encompass all functions describable by deterministic polynomial-size circuits [24, 16, 15, 8, 11] . We continue this line of research to move even beyond deterministic polynomial-size circuits: specifically, we consider the case of randomized functionalities. Indeed, not only are randomized functionalities strongly motivated by real-world scenarios, but randomized functionalities present new challenges for functional encryption. Techniques developed in the context of functional encryption for deterministic circuit do not directly translate into techniques for randomized circuits. To understand the basic technical problem, below we give an illustrative example.
Let us illustrate the desiderata for functional encryption for randomized functions by considering an example of performing an audit on an encrypted database through random sampling. Suppose there is a bank that maintains large secure databases of the transactions in each of its branches. There is an auditor Alice who would like to gain access to a random sample of database entries from each branch in order to manually audit these records and check for improper transactions. We note that random sampling of transactions for manual analysis is quite common during audits. There are two primary concerns:
-The auditor wants to ensure that cheating in a branch is caught with reasonable probability. -The organization wants to ensure that a malicious auditor cannot learn undesirable information (e.g., too much about a particular customer) from the encrypted databases. In particular, it wants to ensure that a malicious auditor cannot gain access to arbitrarily chosen parts of the database, but rather is limited to seeing only a randomly selected sample for each branch.
If we try to solve this problem naively using functional encryption, by giving the auditor a secret key SK f that lets it obtain a random subset of an encrypted database CT, we are faced with the question: where does the randomness come from? Clearly, the randomness cannot be specified in the ciphertext alone since then a cheating encrypter (bank branch) could influence it. It cannot be specified in the decryption key alone as well: then auditor would get the same (or correlated) sample from the databases of different branches. ( We also stress that since functional encryption does not guarantee function privacy, randomness present in the function f , even if chosen by a trusted party, would be known to Alice.)
Even if the randomness was chosen by an XOR of coins built into the decryption key and the ciphertext, this would allow malicious encryptors, over time, to ensure correlations among the random coins used by the auditor when inspecting different databases (or the same database after updates to it). Such correlations could potentially be used to eventually learn completely the coins embedded in the decryption key (based on the auditor's actions in response to planted improprieties in databases). Another option is to use a pseudorandom function (PRF) whose key is inbuilt in the decryption key. However again, since functional encryption does not guarantee function privacy, the PRF key could be completely leaked to a malicious auditor. As a result, the sample would not be "random" anymore in the auditor's view (since he knows the PRF key).
This scenario also illustrates the importance of dealing with dishonest encryptors in the context of functional encryption for randomized functionalities, because of the influence they can have on the choice of coins used in computing the output. The issue of dishonest encryptors is, in fact, also relevant to the case of deterministc functionalities.
5 However, to the best of our knowledge, this issue was never considered explicitly in previous work on functional encryption. This is perhaps because in the context of deterministic functionalities, the issue of dishonest encryptors seems very related to simple correctness, which is not the case in the current work.
Defining functional encryption for randomized functionalities. To avoid the problems sketched in the examples above, we define functional encryption for randomized functionalities using the simulation paradigm: We want that an adversary, given SK f and an honestly generated encryption of x, be simulatable given only f (x; r) where r is true randomness that is completely unknown to the adversary. At the same time, consider an adversary that can generate dishonest ciphertextŝ CT and learn from outside the output of decryptingĈT using a secret key SK g (that is unknown to the adversary). We want such an adversary to be simulatable given only g(x; r), wherex is an input that is information-theoretically fixed byĈT and r is again true randomness that is unknown to the adversary. Note that a crucial feature of our definition is that if a party uses a secret key SK f on a particular ciphertext CT, it will always get back f (x; r) for the same randomness r. In other words, the user cannot repeatedly sample the functionality to obtain multiple outputs for different random coins. This allows users of our definition to more tightly control how much information an adversary or user learns. However, given two distinct ciphertexts CT 1 and CT 2 both encrypting x, a malicious user possessing SK f should obtain exactly two independent samples of the output of the function: f (x; r 1 ) and f (x; r 2 ).
Application to differentially private data release. A natural application of functional encryption would be to provide non-interactive differentially private data release with high levels of accuracy. Consider a scenario where a government would like to allow researchers to carry out research studies on different hospital patient record databases, but only if the algorithm that analyzes the patient data achieves a sufficient level of differential privacy. Without using cryptography, methods for allowing the hospitals to publish differentially private data that would allow for meaningful and diverse research studies must incur very high accuracy loss [10] . An alternative would be to have a government agency review a specific research algorithm f , and if the algorithm guarantees sufficient privacy, to issue a secret key SK f that the researcher could use to obtain the output of her algorithm on any hospital's encrypted patient records. Note that in such a setting, the hospital patient record could be encrypted and stored without any noise addition. The noise could be added by the algorithm f after computing the correct output. Such a setting would ensure very high accuracy (essentially the same as the interactive setting where the hospitals store data in clear and answer the researcher queries after adding noise in an online fashion).
Note however, to achieve differential privacy, such an algorithm f must be randomized. Furthermore, typical differentially private algorithms require that the randomness used to compute the output must be correctly and freshly sampled each time and be kept secret (or else the differential privacy could be completely compromised). By realizing functional encryption that would allow such randomized function evaluation, we would simultaneously remove the need for the hospital to participate in any study beyond simply releasing an encrypted database, and remove the need for the researcher to share his hypothesis and algorithm with any entity beyond the government regulatory body that issues secret keys.
Our Results
We show how to formalize the definition sketched above, generalizing the simulationbased security definitions given in [4, 21] . We then construct a functional encryption scheme supporting arbitrary randomized polynomial-size circuits assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and one-way functions. We prove security in the selective model that can be amplified to full security using standard complexity leveraging.
While our focus is on simulation-based security, we note that it cannot be realized for an unbounded number of messages [4, 3] . Towards that end, in Sect. 2.1, we also provide indistinguishability based security definitions for randomized functions, generalizing the case of deterministic functions [4, 21] . We prove security in the selective model for an unbounded number of messages (again, this can be amplified to full security using standard complexity leveraging 6 ). The starting point for our construction is the functional encryption scheme of [11] for polynomial-size deterministic circuits. In that scheme, in essence the secret key SK f is built upon obfuscating the function f using an indistinguishability obfuscator [2] . We show how to modify this construction to achieve our notion of functional encryption for randomized functionalities by building upon the recently introduced idea of punctured programming [26] . In particular, we embed a psuedo-random function (PRF) key into the obfuscated program, which is executed on the ciphertext, to obtain the randomness used to derive the output. We adapt ideas from [9, 23] to ensure that valid ciphertexts are unique. The core of our argument of security is to show that indistinguishability obfuscation guarantees the secrecy of the random coins derived by this method.
Our results immediately imply the application to differential privacy: Consider two "neighboring" databases x 0 and x 1 . Differential privacy guarantees that the statistical distance between the distributions of outputs of the mechanism f for these two databases is at most e , a small (but non-negligible) quantity. Now consider an adversary's view given an encryption of x 0 . By our simulation-based notion of security, the adversary's view can be simulated given only f (x 0 ; r) where r is true (secret) randomness. This view is e close to the view that would be generated given only f (x 1 ; r), by differential privacy of f . Finally we apply our definition to show that this view is negligibly close to the real adversary's view given an encryption of x 1 . Thus, our functional encryption scheme when applied to f yields a computationally differentially private mechanism.
Other Applications
Subsequent to our work, Garg et al. [12] use functional encryption for randomized functions in N C 1 as a crucial tool to construct fully secure functional encryption for all circuits from multilinear maps. We refer the reader to their paper for more details.
Related Work
In an independent and concurrent work, Alwen et al. [1] also study functional encryption for randomized functions. 7 The main difference between their work and ours is that they do not consider security against malicious encryptors. In particular, they provide a construction of FE for randomized functions from FE for deterministic functions by encrypting a PRF key along with every message. This PRF key is evaluated over the identifier associated with a function key to sample randomness on the fly, which is then used to compute the function output. Interestingly, they show that a 2-ary version of randomized FE can be used to construct fully homomorphic encryption (see [1] for details). However, they do not provide a construction of such an FE scheme.
We note that while the security definition of [1] suffices for their target application, in this work, we model randomized functionalities following the standard approach in secure computation where in the ideal world, no single party has full control over the randomness used in the function evaluation and instead the randomness is chosen by the trusted party. In particular, we require that the randomness used for the computation is chosen uniformly even if either of the parties is malicious. Indeed, as discussed earlier, this is the main source of non-triviality in our results.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting the formal definitions for functional encryption for randomized functionalities (Sect. 2). Next, we recall the definitions for various cryptographic primitives used in our construction (Sect. 3). We then present our construction of functional encryption for randomized functionalities (Sect. 4) and prove its security in the selective model (Sect. 5).
Functional Encryption for Randomized Functions
In this section, we present definitions for functional encryption for randomized functions (or rand-FE for short). We start by presenting the syntax for rand-FE and then proceed to give the security definitions for the same.
Syntax. Throughout the paper, we denote the security parameter by 1 κ . Let X = {X κ } κ∈N , R = {R κ } κ∈N and Y = {Y κ } κ∈N be ensembles where each X κ , R κ and Y κ is a finite set. Let F = {F κ } κ∈N be an ensemble where each F κ is a finite collection of randomized functions. Each function f ∈ F κ takes as input a string x ∈ X κ and randomness r ∈ R κ and outputs f (x; r) ∈ Y κ .
A functional encryption scheme FE for randomized functions F consists of four algorithms (rFE.Setup, rFE.Enc, rFE.Keygen, rFE.Dec):
-Setup rFE.Setup(1 κ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs the public key MPK and the master secret key MSK.
-Encryption rFE.Enc(x, MPK) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a message x and the public key MPK and outputs a ciphertext CT. -Key Generation rFE.Keygen(f, MSK) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a function f ∈ F and the master secret key MSK and outputs a secret key SK f . -Decryption rFE.Dec(CT, SK f ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext CT, the public key MPK and a secret key SK f and outputs a string y ∈ Y κ .
Definition 1 (Correctness).
A functional encryption scheme FE for randomized function family F is correct if for every polynomial n = n(κ), every f ∈ F n κ and every x ∈ X n κ , the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
, where:
where r i,j ← R κ Remark 1. We note that unlike the case of deterministic functions where it suffices to define correctness for a single ciphertext and a single key, in the case of randomized functions, it is essential to define correctness for multiple ciphertexts and functions. To see this, consider the scenario where a secret key SK f corresponding to a function f is implemented in such a way that it has some "fixed" randomness r hardwired in it. Now, upon decrypting any ciphertext CT ← rFE.Enc(x, MPK) with SK f , one would obtain the output f (x; r) w.r.t. the same randomness r. Note that this clearly incorrect implementation of SK f would satisfy the correctness definition for a single ciphertext and a single key, but will fail to satisfy our definition given above.
Security for Functional Encryption
We now present our security definitions for rand-FE. We first observe that existing security definitions for functional encryption only consider the malicious receiver setting, in that they intuitively guarantee that an adversary who owns a secret key SK f corresponding to a function f cannot learn anymore than f (x) from an encryption of x. In this work, we are also interested in achieving security against malicious senders. In particular, we would like to guarantee that an adversarial encryptor cannot force "bad" outputs on an honest receiver. As discussed earlier, this is particularly important when modeling randomized functions.
We consider a a unified adversarial model that captures both malicious receivers and malicious senders. We present both simulation-based and indistinguishability based security definitions. For simplicity, we present our security definitions for the selective model, where the adversary must decide the challenge messages up front, before the system parameters are chosen.
Simulation Based Security We now present a simulation-based security definition (or, SIM-security) for rand-FE. If we only consider malicious receivers, then our definition looks essentially identical to the standard (selective) SIM-security definition for FE (for deterinistic functions) [4, 21] . In order to provide security against adversarial senders, we extend the existing definition. To understand the main idea behind our definition, let us consider an honest receiver who owns a secret key SK f corresponding to a function f . Then, in order to formalize the intuition that an adversarial sender cannot force "incorrect" outputs on this honest receiver, we allow the adversary to make decryption queries for arbitrary ciphertexts 8 w.r.t. the secret key SK f . In the ideal world, the simulator must be able to"extract" the plaintext x from each decryption query and compute as output f (x; r) for some true randomness r. We then require that the decryption query in the real world yields an indistinguishable output.
We now proceed to give our formal definition. For simplicity, below we define security w.r.t. black-box simulators, although we note that our definition can be easily extended to allow for non-black-box simulation following [3, 8] . Our definition is parameterized by q that denotes the number of challenge messages.
Definition 2 (SIM-security for rand-FE). A functional encryption scheme FE for the randomized function family F is said to be q-SIM-secure if there exists a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) such that for every PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ), the outputs of the following two experiments are computationally indistinguishable:
where, 1. Real experiment: In this experiment, O 1 (MSK, ·) denotes the key generation oracle rFE.Keygen(·, MSK). The set {f } denotes the key queries made by A 2 and A 3 . O 2 (MSK, ·, ·) denotes a decryption oracle that takes inputs of the form (CT, g) where g ∈ F. If the query is from A 3 , then we require that CT = CT * i . O 2 computes SK g ← rFE.Keygen(g, MSK) and returns rFE.Dec(CT, SK g ). The set {g} denotes the functions that appear in the decryption queries of A 2 and A 3 and {y} denotes the responses of O 2 . 2. Ideal experiment: O 1 (·) denotes the simulator algorithm S 2 (st , ·) that has oracle access to the ideal functionality KeyIdeal(x, ·). The functionality KeyIdeal accepts key queries f and returns f (x i , r i ) for every x i ∈ x and randomly chosen r i ∈ R κ . The set {f } denotes the key queries made by S 2 to KeyIdeal. O 2 (·, ·) denotes the simulator algorithm S 3 (st , ·, ·) that has oracle access to ideal functionality DecryptIdeal(·, ·). The functionality DecryptIdeal accepts input queries (x, g ) and returns y = g (x; r) for randomly chosen r ∈ R κ . The set {g } denotes the functions that appear in the queries of S 3 and {y } denotes the responses of DecryptIdeal.
We note that in the above selective security definition, pre-ciphertext key queries are essentially redundant since an adversary can defer all such queries to the post-ciphertext key query phase. Nevertheless, we present our definition in the above form to remain syntactically consistent with the full security definition that consists of two distinct key query phases.
Indistinguishability Based Security Here we present indistinguishabilitybased security definitions for rand-FE. We give two (incomparable) definitions: the first definition, referred to as IND pre -security allows for adversaries that make key queries before obtaining the public key. The second definition, referred to as IND post -security, allows for key queries after the adversary receives the public key, but puts additional constraints on the distribution of these queries. In both cases, we strengthen the adversary by allowing decryption queries in a similar manner as the SIM-security definition.
Security against key queries before public key. We first give a security definition for the case where the adversary is restricted to making key queries before obtaining the public key. Similar to the FE definition for deterministic functions [4, 21] , we consider two worlds: a left world where the adversary requests ciphertexts for challenge message x 0 , and a right world where the challenge message is x 1 . Our definition differs from standard definition for (deterministic) FE in two ways. First, instead of requiring the outputs corresponding to x 0 and x 1 to be equal (for every key query f ), we now require them to be computationally indistinguishable 9 (given the auxiliary input of the adversary). Second, we strengthen the adversary by allowing her to make decryption queries in the same manner as the SIM-security definition.
is defined as follows :
In the above experiment:
1. Let {f } denote the list of key queries made by A 1 to the key generation oracle. Then, the distributions (z, {f (x 0 )}) and (z, {f (x 1 )}) are computationally indistinguishable.
O(MSK, ·, ·) denotes a decryption oracle that takes inputs of the form (CT, g)
where g ∈ F. It then computes SK g ← rFE.Keygen(g, MSK) and returns rFE.Dec(CT, SK g ). Security against key queries after public-key. Next we give a security definition for the case where the adversary is allowed to make key queries after obtaining the public key. The crucial difference from the previous definition is that we now require that the output distributions in the left and right world should be statistically indistinguishable.
Definition 4 (IND post
1. Let {f } denote the list of key queries made by A 2 to the key generation oracle. Then the distributions (MPK, z, {f (x 0 )}) and (MPK, z, {f (x 1 )}) are statistically indistinguishable. 2. O(MSK, ·, ·) denotes a decryption oracle that takes inputs of the form (CT, g) where CT = CT * and g ∈ F. It computes SK g ← rFE.Keygen(g, MSK) and returns rFE.Dec(CT, SK g ).
Remark 3 (Unbounded IND post security). Similar to Definition 3, the above definition can also be naturally extended to capture security for multiple challenge messages. We call this unbounded IND post security. Note that one-message IND post security implies unbounded IND post security.
Remark 4 (Statistical vs Computational Indistinguishability).
Note that if we modify Definition 4 by requiring the output distributions to be computationally indistinguishable (as in Definition 3, then it may result in a circularity. Consider a key query f from A 2 that simply re-encrypts the plaintext underlying the challenge ciphertext CT * b .
10 In this case, the requirement on the output distributions is the same as our desired security guarantee for the challenge ciphertexts, which results in a vaccuous definition. By requiring the output distributions to be statistically indistinguishable, we are able to break such circularity.
SIM implies IND It is easy to see that SIM-security implies both IND pre and IND post security. Furthermore, since IND pre (resp., IND post ) security for one message implies unbounded IND pre (resp., IND post ) security, we have that 1-SIM security implies unbounded IND pre and IND post security. We state it below: Lemma 1. Let FE be a 1-SIM-secure FE scheme for randomized function family F. Then FE is also unbounded IND pre -secure and unbounded IND post -secure for F.
The proof follows in the same manner as the case of deterministic functions [4] . We provide a sketch in Appendix B for the case of one message. Combining this with remarks 2 and 3 yields the proof of lemma 1 for unbounded messages.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present definitions for various cryptographic primitives that we shall use in our construction of functional encryption for randomized functions. We assume familiarity with standard semantically secure public-key encryption and strongly unforgeable signature schemes and omit their formal definition from this text. Below, we recall the notions of indistinguishability obfuscation, puncturable pseudorandom functions, non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof systems and perfectly binding commitment schemes.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Here we recall the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation that was defined by Barak et al. [2] . Intuitively speaking, we require that for any two circuits C 1 and C 2 that are "functionally equivalent" (i.e., for all inputs x in the domain, C 1 (x) = C 2 (x)), the obfuscation of C 1 must be computationally indistinguishable from the obfuscation of C 2 . Below we present the formal definition following the syntax of [11] . -Correctness: For every κ ∈ N, every C ∈ C κ , every input x in the domain of C, we have that
-Indistinguishability: For every κ ∈ N, for all pairs of circuits C 0 , C 1 ∈ C κ , if C 0 (x) = C 1 (x) for all inputs x, then for all PPT adversaries A, we have:
Recently, Garg et al. [11] gave the first candidate construction for an indistinguishability obfuscator iO for the circuit class P/poly. Subsequent to their work, Pass et al [22] construct an indistinguishability obfuscator based on an "uber" assumption on multilinear encodings. More recently, Gentry et al [13] construct an indistinguishability obfuscator based on the multilinear subgroup elimination assumption.
Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
Puncturable family of PRFs are a special case of constrained PRFs [6, 7, 20] , where the PRF is defined on all input strings except for a set of size polynomial in the security parameter. Below we recall their definition, as given by [26] .
Syntax A puncturable family of PRFs is defined by a tuple of algorithms (Key, Eval, Puncture) and a pair of polynomials n(·) and m(·) :
-Key Generation Key(1 κ ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs a PRF key K -Punctured Key Generation Puncture(K, S) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a PRF key K, a set S ⊂ {0, 1} n(κ) and outputs a punctured key K S -Evaluation Eval(K, x) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a key K (punctured key or PRF key), a string x ∈ {0, 1} n(κ) and outputs y ∈ {0, 1} m(κ) Definition 6. A family of PRFs Key, Eval, Puncture is puncturable if it satisfies the following properties : -Functionality preserved under puncturing. Let K ← Key(1 κ ), K S ← Puncture(K, S). Then, for all x / ∈ S, Eval(K, x) = Eval(K S , x). -Pseudorandom at punctured points. For every PPT adversary (A 1 , A 2 ) such that A 1 (1 κ ) outputs a set S ⊂ {0, 1} n(κ) , x ∈ S and state st, consider an experiment where K ← Key(1 κ ) and K S ← Puncture(K, S). Then
where U denotes the uniform distribution over bits.
As observed by [20, 6, 7] , the [14] construction of PRFs from one-way functions easily yield puncturable PRFs.
Theorem 1 ([14,20,6,7] ). If one-way functions exist, then for all polynomials n(κ) and m(κ), there exists a puncturable PRF family that maps n(κ) bits to m(κ) bits.
We note that in the above construction, the size of the punctured key K S grows linearly with the size of the punctured set S.
Non-Interactive Witness Indistinguishable Proofs
In this section, we present the definition for non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs. We emphasize that we are interested in proof systems, i.e., where the soundness guarantee holds against computationally unbounded cheating provers.
Syntax. Let R be an efficiently computable relation that consists of pairs (x, w), where x is called the statement and w is the witness. Let L denote the language consisting of statements in R. A non-interactive proof system for a language L consists of a setup algorithm NIWI.Setup, a prover algorithm NIWI.Prove and a verifier algorithm NIWI.Verify, defined as follows:
is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1 κ and outputs a common reference string crs. -Prover NIWI.Prove(crs, x, w) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the common reference string crs, a statement x along with a witness w. (x, w) ∈ R; if so, it produces a proof string π, else it outputs fail. -Verifier NIWI.Verify(crs, x, π) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the common reference string crs and a statement x with a corresponding proof π. It outputs 1 if the proof is valid, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 7 (NIWI).
A non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof system for a language L with a PPT relation R is a tuple of algorithms (NIWI.Setup, NIWI.Prove, NIWI.Verify) such that the following properties hold: where crs ← NIWI.Setup(1 κ ), and the probability is taken over the coins of NIWI.Setup, NIWI.Prove and NIWI.Verify. -Statistical Soundness: For every adversary A, it holds that
-Witness Indistinguishability: For any triplet (x, w 0 , w 1 ) such that (x, w 0 ) ∈ R and (x, w 1 ) ∈ R, the distributions {crs, NIWI.Prove(crs, x, w 0 )} and {crs, NIWI.Prove(crs, x, w 1 )} are computationally indistinguishable, where crs ← NIWI.Setup(1 κ ).
Recently, it was shown by Sahai and Waters [26] that NIWI proofs can be constructed from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions.
Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme Com is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a string x and outputs C ← Com(x). A perfectly binding commitment scheme must satisfy the perfect binding and computational hiding properties : 
For simplicity of exposition, we present our FE scheme in Sect. 4 using a noninteractive perfectly binding scheme. We stress, however, that it is actually sufficient to use a standard 2-round statistically binding scheme in our construction. Such schemes can be based on one way functions.
Our Construction
Let F denote the family of all PPT functions. We now present a functional encryption scheme FE for F. For any a priori bounded q = poly(κ), we prove that FE is q-SIM-secure. Note that from Lemma 1, it follows that FE is also unbounded IND pre and IND post secure. Note that in the case of SIM-security, the size of the secret keys in FE grows linearly with q. It follows from [4, 3, 8] that such a dependence on q is necessary.
Notation. Let (NIWI.Setup, NIWI.Prove, NIWI.Verify) be a NIWI proof system. Let Com be a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Let iO be an indistinguishability obfuscator for all efficiently computable circuits. Let (Key, Puncture, Eval) be a puncturable family of PRF. Let (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Finally, let (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme.
Let c-len = c-len(1 κ ) denote the length of ciphertexts in (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) . Let v-len = v-len(1 κ ) denote the length of verification keys in (Gen, Sign, Verify). We shall use a parameter len = 2 · c-len + v-len in the description of our scheme. We now proceed to describe our scheme FE = (rFE.Setup, rFE.Enc, rFE.Keygen, rFE.Dec).
Setup rFE.Setup(1 κ ): The setup algorithm first computes a CRS crs ← NIWI.Setup for the NIWI proof system. Next, it computes two key pairs -(
-of the public-key encryption scheme. Finally, it computes a commitment C ← Com(0 len ). The public key MPK = (crs, P K 1 , P K 2 , C) and the master secret key MSK = SK 1 . The algorithm outputs (MPK, MSK).
Encryption rFE.Enc(x, MPK): To encrypt a message x, the encryption algorithm first generates a key pair (sk, vk) ← Gen(1 κ ) of the one-time signature scheme. It then computes ciphertexts c 1 ← PKE.Enc(x, P K 1 ; r 1 ) and c 2 ← PKE.Enc(x, P K 2 ; r 2 ). Next, it computes a NIWI proof π ← NIWI.Prove(crs, z, w) for the NP statement z = (z 1 ∨ z 2 ) where z 1 and z 2 are defined as follows:
A witness w real = (x, s 1 , s 2 ) for z 1 is referred to as the real witness, while a witness w trap = s for z 2 is referred to as the trapdoor witness. The honest encryption algorithm uses the real witness w real to compute π. Finally, it computes a signature σ ← Sign(c 1 c 2 π, sk) on the string c 1 c 2 π using sk. The output of the algorithm is the ciphertext CT = (c 1 , c 2 , π, vk, σ) .
Key Generation rFE.Keygen(f, MSK): On input f ,the key generation algorithm first chooses a fresh PRF key K ← Key(1 κ ). It then computes the secret key SK f ← iO(G f ) where the function G f is described in Fig. 1 . Note that G f has the public key MPK, the secret key SK 1 and the PRF key K hardwired in it.
Input: Ciphertext CT Constants: MPK, SK1, K, f 1. Parse CT = (c1, c2, π, vk, σ). 2. If Verify(σ, c1 c2 π, vk) = 0, then output ⊥ and stop, otherwise continue to the next step. 3. If NIWI.Verify(crs, z, π) = 0, then output ⊥ and stop, otherwise continue to the next step. Here z = (c1, c2, vk, P K1, P K2, C) is the statement corresponding to π. 4. Compute x ← PKE.Dec(c1, SK1). 5. Compute r ← Eval(K, c1 c2 vk). 6. Output f (x; r).
Fig. 1. Functionality G f
The algorithm outputs SK f as the secret key corresponding to f .
Size of Function G f . In order to prove that FE is q-SIM-secure, we require the function G f to be padded with zeros such that |G f | = |Sim.G f |, where the "simulated" functionality Sim.G f is described later in Fig. 2 . In this case, the size of SK f grows linearly with q.
Decryption rFE.Dec(CT, SK f ): On input CT, the decryption algorithm computes and outputs SK f (CT).
This completes the description of FE. We prove the correctness of FE in Appendix A. Theorem 2. Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-time computable circuits and one-way functions, the proposed scheme FE is 1-SIMsecure.
Proof of Theorem 2
We now prove that the proposed scheme FE is 1-SIM-secure. Our proof can be naturally extended to q-SIM-security, for any a priori fixed q = poly(κ).
We first construct an ideal world adversary aka simulator S in Sect. 5.1. Next, in Sect. 5.2, we prove indistinguishability of the outputs of the real and ideal world experiments via a hybrid argument.
Description of Simulator
We describe a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) that makes black-box use of a real world adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ).
Algorithm S 1 . S 1 first performs a simulated setup procedure. Namely, it first computes a CRS crs ← NIWI.Setup(1 κ ) for the NIWI proof system and two key pairs -(P K 1 , SK 1 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 κ ) and (P K 2 , SK 2 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 κ ) -for the public-key encryption scheme. Next, it chooses a key pair for the signature scheme -(sk * , vk * ) ← Gen(1 κ ). Then, it computes the commitment C in the following manner: (a) First compute c * 1 ← PKE.Enc(0, P K 1 ) and c * 2 ← PKE.Enc(0, P K 2 ). (b) Next, compute C ← Com(c * 1 c * 2 vk * ). Let s denote the randomness used to compute C . S 1 constructs a proof π * by using the trapdoor witness s, that is, π * ← NIWI.Prove(crs, y, s), where the statement y = (c *
Algorithm S 2 . S 2 simulates the key generation oracle. Whenever A 2 or A 3 makes a key query for a function f , S 2 performs the following sequence of steps:
1. Query the ideal functionality KeyIdeal on input f . Let y * be the output of KeyIdeal . 2. Compute a PRF key K ← Key(1 κ ) and a punctured key K ← Puncture(K, c * 1 c * 2 vk * ). 3. Compute the secret key SK f ← iO(Sim.G f ) where the functionality Sim.G f is described in Fig. 2 . Sim.G f has the public key MPK, secret key SK 1 , the punctured key K , the challenge ciphertext CT * and the output value y * hardwired in it. 4. Return SK f .
2. If Verify(σ, c1 c2 π, vk), then output ⊥ and stop, otherwise continue to the next step. 3. If NIWI.Verify(crs, z, π) = 0, then output ⊥ and stop, otherwise continue to the next step. Here z = (c1, c2, vk, P K1, P K2, C) is the statement corresponding to π. 
Indistinguishability of the Outputs
We now describe a series of hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H 11 , where H 0 corresponds to the real world and H 11 corresponds to the ideal world experiment.
Hybrid H 0 : This is the real experiment. Here, each decryption query (CT, g) is answered using a decryption key sk g ← iO(G g ) where G g is defined in the same manner as G f , except that it has function g hardwired in it.
Hybrid H 1 : This experiment is the same as H 0 except in the manner in which the key queries of the adversary are answered. Let CT * = (c * 1 , c * 2 , π * , vk * , σ * ) denote the challenge ciphertext. Whenever the adversary A 2 or A 3 makes a key query f , we perform the following steps:
1. Compute a PRF key K ← Key(1 κ ) and then compute a punctured key K ← Puncture(K, c Hybrid H 10 : This experiment is the same as H 9 , except that we change the manner in which the key queries are answered. For every key query f , the secret key SK f is computed as SK f ← iO(Sim.G f ).
Hybrid H 11 : This experiment is the same as H 10 , except that we now answer the decryption queries of A 2 and A 3 in the same manner as the simulator algorithm S 3 . Note that this is the ideal experiment.
This completes the description of the hybrid experiments. Next, we prove that for every i, the outputs of experiments H i and H i+1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2. Assuming that iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator, hybrid experiments H 0 and H 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Note that the only difference in H 0 and H 1 is that in the former experiment, we output iO(G f ) as the key corresponding to any key query f , while in the latter experiment, we output iO(Sim.G f ). In order to prove that these two hybrids are computationally indistinguishable, we show that for every key query f , G f and Sim.G f have identical input-output behavior. Then, by security of indistinguishability obfuscation, we would have that iO(G f ) and iO(Sim.G f ) are computationally indistinguishable, which in turn would imply H 0 and H 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Note that both G f and Sim.G f output ⊥ if and only if either the signature σ does not verify or the proof π does not verify; that is, either Verify(σ, c 1 c 2 π, vk) = 0 or NIWI.Verify(crs, y, π) = 0 where y = (c 1 , c 2 , vk, P K 1 , P K 2 , C). Let us call an input CT = (c 1 , c 2 , π, vk, σ) valid if both the signature σ and proof π verify. Next, we prove that both G f in H 0 and Sim.G f in H 1 have the same functionality for all valid inputs.
Claim 1 For any valid input
Proof. We consider two cases : c 1 c 2 vk = c * 1 c * 2 vk * and c 1 c 2 vk = c * 1 c * 2 vk * . For the first case, note that by the first property of constrained PRF, it follows that Eval(K, c 1 c 2 vk) = Eval(K , c 1 c 2 vk) = r. Both G f in H 0 and Sim.G f in H 1 decrypt c 1 using SK 1 to compute x, and then output f (x, r).
In the second case, G f computes r ← Eval(K, c * 1 c * 2 vk * ), and then computes x by decrypting c 1 and outputs y = f (x; r). On the other hand, Sim.G f simply outputs the hard-wired value y * when c 1 c 2 vk = c * 1 c * 2 vk * . However, note that y * = y, thereby ensuring that G f (CT * ) = Sim.G f (CT * ).
Using the above claims, we can now describe our reduction. Assume A 2 and A 3 together make a total of key queries. We define hybrids H 0,i , 0 ≤ i ≤ , as follows: in H 0,i , we respond to the first − i queries using FE.Keygen as in H 0 , and respond to the last i queries as in H 1 . Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists a valid input such that it satisfies neither of the properties. Since NIWI is statistically sound, if the input is valid, then the statement y = (c 1 , c 2 , vk, P K 1 , P K 2 , C) must have either a real witness or a trapdoor witness. Since c 1 and c 2 are encryptions of different messages, a real witness does not exist. Therefore, for the input to be valid, there must exist a trapdoor witness; that is, there exists an s such that C = Com(c 1 c 2 vk; s). However, since C = Com(c * * , yet CT = CT * . In this case, it must be that π * σ * = π σ. Now, if π = π * , then since vk = vk * and (c 1 c 2 π) = (c * 1 c * 2 π * ), we have that σ is a forgery for (c 1 c 2 π). On the other hand, if π = π * , then it must be that σ = σ * . In this case, we have that σ is a strong forgery for (c 1 c 2 π) = (c * 1 c * 2 π * ). We can therefore break the security of the strongly unforgeable one time signature scheme. Proof. Same as in proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 11. Assuming (Gen, Sign, Verify) is a strongly unforgeable one time signature scheme, NIWI is statistically sound, iO is indistinguishability obfuscator and comm is perfectly binding, hybrid experiments H 9 and H 10 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Same as in proof for Lemma 7.
Lemma 12. Assuming (Key, Eval, Puncture) is a puncturable family of PRFs, hybrid experiments H 10 and H 11 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. In H 10 , on receiving a decryption query (CT, g), we sample PRF key K and decrypt CT using sk g ← iO(G g ), where CT = (c 1 , c 2 , π, vk, σ) and G g uses randomness r ← Eval(K, c 1 c 2 vk) to compute the output g(x, Eval(K, c 1 c 2 vk)). On the other hand, in H 11 , the output is computed as g(x, r) ← DecryptIdeal(x, g) where r $ ← R κ . If there exists an efficient adversary that can distinguish between the outputs of H 10 and H 11 with non negligible probability, then there exists an efficient adversary that can distinguish between the output of Eval from a truly random string with non negligible probability, thereby breaking the security of a pseudorandom function.
A Correctness of F E Theorem 3. If (Key, Puncture, Eval) is a PRF, then the proposed scheme FE satisfies correctness.
Proof. We first prove this theorem for a single key. Fix any f ∈ F κ , x ∈ X n κ . Consider the distribution Real 1 : {rFE.Dec(CT i , SK f )} This lemma can be extended, via a standard hybrid argument, to prove that the Real and Ideal distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
B SIM security implies IND pre and IND post security
We first prove that 1-SIM security implies one-message IND pre security. We actually prove the stronger statement that 1-SIM security implies one-message IND pre security where in SIM security, the adversary is restricted to making all of the key queries before receiving the public key. Let x 0 , x 1 ∈ X κ be any two messages. Let (1 κ ), the simulator receives the output of every key query f on message x 0 .) Now, since Definition 3 requires the promise that (z, {f (x 0 )}) and (z, {f (x 1 )}) are computationally indistinguishable, we have that IDEAL The proof that 1-SIM security implies one-message IND post security follows in a similar manner as above. In particular, note that in this case, we have the promise from Definition 4 that (z, {f (x 0 )}) and (z, {f (x 1 )}) are statistically indistinguishable. This immediately implies that (MPK, MSK, z, {f (x 0 )}) and (MPK, MSK, z, {f (x 1 )}) are computationally indistinguishable. The rest of the steps of the proof follow similarly as above.
